Are Chinese Enterprises’ Charitable Donations “Political Contributions”?——Evidence from the Replacements of the Municipal Party Secretaries by 冯舒
学校编码：10384 
学号：27720111152661
         
硕  士  学  位  论  文
         
中国企业的慈善捐赠是一种“政治献金”吗
？——来自市委书记更替的证据
         
Are Chinese Enterprises’ Charitable
Donations “Political
Contributions”?——Evidence from the
Replacements of the Municipal Party
Secretaries
         
冯舒
         
指导教师：潘越    
         
专业名称：金融学(含保险学) 
         














         





         
         
另外，该学位论文为(                  )课题(组)的研究成果
，获得(                    )课题(组)经费或实验室的资助，在(
          )实验室完成。(请在以上括号内填写课题或课题组负责人或
实验室名称，未有此项声明内容的，可以不作特别声明。)
         
         
         
声明人(签名)：
         
         














         







         
         
本学位论文属于：
         
         
(     )1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，于
年 月 日解密，解密后适用上述授权。
         
         
(     )2.不保密，适用上述授权。
         





         
         
         
声明人(签名)：
         
         














         
         



































         
         
   As the representatives of the power, the government officials can change the
financial regulation and the economic policy with legal authority. Therefore, the
replacements of government officials have gradually get scholars' attention in
recent years. At present, most scholars explore its influence on the region’s
macroeconomic and companies’ investment decision. The author thinks that it
would not only increase the companies’ uncertain risk, but also their opportunity in
the new round of resource allocation. Would the companies establish the political
relationship with charitable donations to benefit from it? This is the new problem
we want to solve.
  Choosing the A-share listed companies in China during 2006 and 2011 as a
study sample,we selected the local government transition (the replacement of
municipal party secretary )as a new angle of view and empirically studied its
influence on corporate charitable donations. Meanwhile we analyzed this
influence in detail from the dimensions of companies’ characters of property
rights, the last job locations of the new officials and the market levels of the cities.
We have found that the scale and inclination of corporate charitable donations
would increase when political uncertainty caused by the replacements of the
officials occurred. By group testing, we have found this positive effect would be
more obvious if the company was non-state, or the new official was from a
different city, or the city’s market level was higher. After a further examination, we
found the private enterprises would get more benefit in financing, government
subsidies and investment opportunities. Therefore, we thought the corporate
charitable donations as “Political Contributions” paid by companies to establish
the political relationship and compete for the dominant position in the new round
of resource allocation. We not only enriched the research on the politically













understand how Chinese companies deal with the risk and opportunities in an
uncertain political environment caused by the local government transition.
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